RELATED TOPIC: Proximate Cause
FACTS: In June 1980, Cosmos and Intergames organized the “1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon”, a 10-kilometer race. Rommel, the plaintiffs’ son, participated after meeting all the requirements. During the race, he was hit by a jeepney due to inadequate safety measures along the route. Despite receiving medical treatment, Rommel died the same day from severe head injuries. The plaintiffs allege that the organizers failed to ensure proper safety precautions for the participants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the organizers was the proximate cause of Rommel’s death.
DECISION: Yes. The negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel, and the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.
Proximate cause is “that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred.”
First of all, Intergames’ negligence in not conducting the race on a road blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the race through its volunteers.
Thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel.
An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be “one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury that might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate cause of the final injury.”
Read the full case here.
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